Although the forms, intensity, range and addressees of such social movements do not allow a straightforward comparison of the reactions to 19th-century industrialisation -the "satanic mills" of the 19th century (Polanyi 1977 ) -with the protests of the early 21st century, the transnational social question is nevertheless prominent on the global political agenda.
However, in contrast to the social inequalities of the 19th century, those of today are of a transnational scope and are discussed in national and transnational political forums explicitly against the background of human rights and social citizens' rights. During the East-West conflict, issues concerning transnational social inequality would have been localized strictly within the context of the development paradigm (cf. Menzel 1992) . Some even claim that the development paradigm is being replaced by a global socio-political or structural policy paradigm (Klempp 2001) . In the light of a growing awareness of interdependencies in the age of globalisation, the shift from the concept of development policy to a global social or structural policy also implies a shift in perspective from the remedial development of the "Third" or even "Fourth" World to a global social policy.
International organisations such as the World Bank meanwhile no longer discuss social security and social rights merely as a contributive factor to economic development, but as intrinsic rights (World Bank 2001) . Historically, international institutions have sought to derive social rights from human rights (see Kaufmann 2003) . For instance, in the Annual Report of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), explicit reference is made to the General Declaration of Human Rights (1948) , the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and even the rights of citizens to a social contract on the nation-state level: Every person "is entitled to realization, through national effort, and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality." (UNDP 2005) The Civil and Social Covenants of the United Nations Organization, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various regional declarations 1 emphasize the universality of human rights and citizens' rights (cf. Brysk and Shafir 2004) . They are universal in the sense that, for instance, all member states are signatories of the International Covenant on Social and Economic Rights, i.e., the Social Covenant. The essential social rights laid down in Articles 22-27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) are a fundamental right to school education, the right to work and to join or form a trade union, the right to a basic or minimum income, food, clothing, housing, medical care and social security.
In the second half of the 20 th century, the moral ethos of "rights" gained strong significance not just in national welfare states in Europe, Northern America, Australia and Japan, but all around the world. For political debate on social inequality two postulates were and still are of crucial significance: equality (of opportunities) and democracy. These postulates were already the subject of political discourse over 150 years ago when they were analysed by Alexis de Tocqueville (1986) in the light of events in the USA. A recent Human Development Report states: "The basic objective of human development is to enlarge the range of people's choices to make development more democratic and participatory. These choices should include access to income and employment opportunities, education and health, and a clean and safe physical environment. Each individual should also have the opportunity to participate fully in community decisions and to enjoy human, economic and political freedoms." (1991: 9) It might appear tempting to dismiss such declarations as the "cheap rhetoric" of international organisations. And it would certainly be presumptuous to speak of social rights at a transnational level in the sense of social citizenship. 2 Nevertheless, it is worth tracing this discursive turning point and establishing its value for an analysis of the transnational social question. In addition to the concept of social rights, that of citizens' rights, or citizenship, also brings us forward here. Citizenship can be understood as a continuous series of transactions between rulers and subjects. This is particularly interesting in the tradition of T.H. Marshall (1964) , because it captures the tensions between democracy and capitalism. The central focus of Marshall's theory on citizenship is the inherent tension between the idea of democracy, which is based on the notion of equal citizenship, and the social inequalities brought about by capitalism. One of the consequences of globalisation for the individual state and also at transnational, and indeed global, level is not only an increase in cross-border movements of capital, services and sometimes people, but also a perception of interdependency in this respect and a growing global social awareness, or even a notion of a world society (Robertson 1992) .
Marshall argues that the expansion of citizenship rights, and especially the growth of social rights in the course of the 20 th century, also enabled an historic compromise between social classes. In Europe, the solution to the social question was linked with the development of social rights, and with these, citizenship status. The possibility of this happening today on a global scale is more a normative utopian idea. There is no feasible concept of citizenship with equal political rights in any kind of global community, although there is a tendency towards an establishment of social rights in loose association with human rights.
Nevertheless there are identifiable global trends in meta-principles such as the postulates of equality and democracy that show a shift in public awareness concerning transnational exchange, interdependence and dependencies. More information, and possibly even a greater knowledge of transnational social inequality, is available now than was in the past (see, e.g. Inglehart et al. 2004) . The present analysis discusses these shifts in the spatial, institutional and discursive dimensions of transnational social rights on two levels: firstly in geopolitical terms, i.e. in terms of the spatial distribution of citizenship and social rights in 2 "Citizenship requires (...) a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty to a civilisation which is a common possession." (Marshall 1964: 92) Social rights refer to "the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society" (ibid.: 72). different partial worlds of social citizenship; secondly, taking social and labour norms as an example, in terms of discursive and institutional developments across state borders.
Social inequality can be understood from two angles, which reflects the tension between the nation-state and global dynamics. On the one hand, national citizenship, or nationality, determines the spatial distribution of transnational social inequality. This is because, firstly, the principles of the attribution of formal membership according to descent or place of birth have significant consequences for substantial social inequalities and life chances. Secondly, the degree to which social rights and standards are established and implemented varies extremely in different parts of the world. The mechanisms by which membership is attributed and the level of provision of social security reinforce and consolidate global social inequalities. On the other hand, the universally accepted understanding of equality and democratization has brought the management of global economic distortions and a new mix of institutions and agencies into focus, as in the case of work and social standards. The chief concern from this angle is thus the global significance of transnational regulations that might even be a forerunner of transborder social rights. These transnational social legal standards are, however, not legal claims in a narrow sense that they can be claimed by legal means.
These two observations correspond to problems and promises of two major political paradigms. The elimination of major inequalities between North and South in terms of social rights on a national scale, as part of a development project announced by President Truman in his inaugural address in 1949, can be read as an anticipatory declaration to the newly independent ex-colonies in the 1950s and 1960s that "underdevelopment" would soon be overcome and problems of political and economic development would be dealt with effectively. The fulfilment of these promises was soon open to severe doubt with the failure of the new economic order in the late 1970s and the debt crisis of many developing countries during the 1980s. The subsequent emergence of social standards on a transnational scale reflected a political reaction, or counter-movement to economic and politically framed globalisation. The first phase was characterised by the political objectives of international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank to overcome the alleged domination of the state over the market as a principle of social order. These objectives included the privatisation and deregulation of the markets during the 1980s and later the reemphasis on old, well-known elements of economic regulation: the rule of law, democracy, as well as, more recently, fairness and equal opportunities; also, less emphatically, but significantly, the notion of community. An example of the latter element is the emphasis of the role of migrants as development workers in their countries of origin (McMichael 2004) . The two paradigms had, and still have, different objectives: the development paradigm aims to emulate the western-style nation-state in the developing countries, while the global socio-political paradigm focuses on the North/South interdependencies arising out of globalisation. While in academic discourse on social inequality a paradigm shift is currently taking place from development to global structural policy, the substantial issues have remained the same.
On the basis of a discussion on the state of the art of research on transnational social rights, it is the aim of this paper to identify new analytical strands with respect to the transnational social question. The following four questions will thereby be examined: Firstly, what concepts are meaningful for an analysis of the transnational social question and related social rights 
II. Social Rights within the World Political System and in Nation-States
Changes in the perception of the transnational social question take place not only in a global economic system, but also within an asymmetrically structured world political system (Wallerstein 1983 , Zolberg 1987 . The relatively autonomous world political system, with nation-states as its main constituents, is central to the inequalities in the distribution of social rights. Social rights are institutionalised within nation-states and distinct from objective rights, which protect individuals from violence or restraint. The latter thus include, for instance, the freedom of association, freedom of opinion and religious freedom. Social rights are also defined as positive rights as opposed to negative rights (Höffe 2002) , which are rights to liberty, i.e. political and civil rights. Positive rights require the active intervention of the state.
The relationship between negative and positive rights is not dichotomous, however. Political rights are necessary at least in democracies in order to create social rights. The formal equality of rights is by no means sufficient for them to be effective. They must be accompanied by substantial liberties. This is why Sen's "capability approach" is of significance, because it shifts the focus of rights away from entitlements to the ability to make use of such liberties and thus brings institutional opportunity structures into the debate (Sen 1999 ).
The debate on transnational social rights sui generis emerged in connection with the growing perception of increasing global threats and interdependencies. The anticipation of mass migration from Eastern to Western Europe in the early 1990s may serve as an example here.
The question arose whether social rights could also be conferred to persons abroad, for instance in the form of a basic minimal income (de Swaan 1992) . Not unlike the emergence of national social welfare in the 19 th century, such a development was also thought to be conceivable on a transnational scale. In the 19 th and early 20 th centuries, it was argued, the ruling classes felt threatened to such a degree by "vagabond poor" that some states introduced welfare measures to offset this threat. The perceived threat of mass migration from Eastern Europe and the Third World, so the argument continues, had meanwhile become so great that northern states were called upon to contribute toward a welfare state at the supranational level (cf. de Swaan 1988) . It is meanwhile clear that in the light of effective controls at the borders of European immigration countries there is no forceful argument for implementing this measure to prevent migration (cf. Faist and Ette 2007) . However, it is apparent from this political demand that an awareness of the transnational social question and possible social rights is closely linked with the perception of interdependencies. One starting point is the analogy with the social question prevalent in the 19 th century. In those days brutal repression and Anti-Socialist Laws were one defence strategy against the uprising of the lower classes. An alternative strategy was to introduce socio-political reforms and the political integration of broad sections of the population. The latter paved the way for social rights. To continue briefly with this analogy, the "War on Terrorism" and, more especially, the often called-for conflation of migration control and development policy to form a structural social policy at European Union level, are each strategies for dealing with what has meanwhile become a transnational social question. Proponents of the socio-political strategy seek to implement worldwide measures for combating poverty and promoting development. The UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are the most salient example. 3 Another strategy is the cultivation of a weaker variety of social rights in the form of labour and social standards or social clauses in transnational business agreements. Even weaker forms are voluntary commitments undertaken by transnational businesses with socalled social labels or codes of conduct.
For the conceptualization of emergent transnational social rights there are two types of approach, one stemming from normative political philosophy, and the other from political sociology, more specifically from differentiation-theoretical assumptions of world society theory. In normative political theory, in turn, two branches can be distinguished: a world citizenship -or cosmopolitan -perspective, and a nationality perspective. In a world citizenship perspective, social rights are part of a desirable world citizenship. An optimistic perspective can refer to Max Weber's social and economic history (Weber 1980 ) and argue that citizenship was first conceived and practised at municipal level before it moved up one level and became de jure and de facto congruous with membership of a territorial nationstate. Citizenship and citizenship rights beyond the nation-state would therefore be an evolutionary leap forward (Heater 2004) . This would, however, require a global political community with socio-cultural resources such as generalised reciprocity and diffuse solidarity to be drawn on as required. This would be a broad extension of Immanuel Kant's idea of a cosmopolitan right to hospitality (Linklater 1999 ) by means of a rational development of identities beyond the national level. Such a global political identity is today only conceivable as a transparent, constructed affiliation (Habermas 1998) . This perspective would certainly be attractive in terms of the allocation of life chances according to nationality. World citizenship would not acknowledge any privileges passed on by descent or birth within a certain territory. We would all formally have the same status as members of an allencompassing, global polity. Such a community would, however, not only be greatly endangered by a "tyranny of the majority" (de Tocqueville 1959) because of the unavailability of exit options. More importantly in the context of transnational social rights, however, is that as positive rights, they would require a willingness to redistribute goods, i.e. reciprocity and solidarity. This notion is even less probable and less conceivable on a global scale than it is in regions like Europe. While these qualities can be observed when disaster strikes or in development policies, they have no legal status and certainly no regulative components like, say, EU social policy. convention with the help of an income limit threshold calculated on the basis of a purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate (cf. Human Development Report 2005: 232). This critique of the concept of world citizenship highlights the central elements of a republican version of national cosmopolitanism. The republican version grasps social rights primarily as a close form of solidarity on a national scale. As a consequence of this, the following conditions can only be fulfilled in a nation-state: first, only citizens of the respective nationality are counted as valid members of a framed political community and in this way secure the socio-cultural basis for citizenship, reciprocity and solidarity. Second, a common culture has a bonding effect on the citizens and enables them to agree on substantive rights and obligations that form the basis for their membership. Third, citizenship confers participatory rights and political representation. Ultimately, world citizenship from this perspective appears to be little more than a vague cosmopolitan idea in a world lacking a fundamental moral consensus. A further criticism is that at best world citizenship would weaken the bonds that hold citizens of a nation-state together. And only these national bonds ensure that citizens maintain their ties to the rest of humanity (see Walzer 1996) . While this critique of the concept of world citizenship may be to the point, this version of national citizenship neglects the fact that is in itself a mechanism that perpetuates transnational social inequality.
These normative considerations must now be supplemented by socio-political reflections which can be empirically validated (Benhabib 2004: 143) , in order to shift the focus on actually emerging legal constructs and especially their institutional context. To this end world society theory is useful. It has at least two branches, a theory of functional differentiation (Luhmann 1997 ) and a set of neo-institutionalist theories (Meyer et al. 1997) . All these theories are revised versions of the original modernisation theory, and have replaced the nation-state with a world society as the main frame of reference. The world society theory, which is based on a theory of functional differentiation, sets out from the assumption that in an age when the postulate of equal opportunity is claimed to have universal validity 4 , world society offers the widest scope for an analysis of domestic and transnational social inequality. In a weak sense, world society can be conceived of as a horizon of expectation and meaning, not necessarily of concrete institutions (Wobbe 2000: 28). Remarkably, in the literature on differentiation theory the debate on the transnational social question has only begun to attract attention (Greve and Heintz 2005) , and the question of social rights has not attracted any attention at all so far. From a system-theoretical perspective the neglect of 4 The postulate of equality can be interpreted in very different ways. Besides the equality of opportunity it can be understood as the "equality of social conditions", or what Tocqueville (1959) labels égalité des conditions. social rights comes as no surprise, as the majority of the poor in so-called developing countries are excluded from functional systems such as education and the economy, and therefore ultimately cannot be mobilized on this issue (Luhmann 1997/II: 632-3) . This argument overlooks the fact, however, that social movements and NGOs demand social rights directly as advocates of the poor, or that the poor make claims themselves.
Neo-institutionalist world society theory (Meyer et al. 1997 ) examines at one level of abstraction lower whether there are institutional forms, such as educational systems and social insurance systems, that are common to all states. Yet this kind of neo-institutionalist theory has not yet examined how such institutions are structured to contribute to the diffusion of social rights. There is clear evidence, for instance, that in many developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa and in Southern Asia the expansion of the education system, structured into a primary, secondary and tertiary schooling, contributes to even greater social inequality because it is exploited by local elites to secure privileges for their own offspring (Bevans 2004 , Davis 2004 . Another question that is not explored by advocates of the world polity approach is whether certain functions are not fulfilled by completely different systems, for instance informal systems of social security. Such systems cannot simply be categorized as 'traditional', as they are primarily the consequence of unfulfilled promises made by postcolonial states and international organisations (Rist 1999) . Consequently, social rights and other, more informal, commitments must not only be sought in state/citizen relations, but also in other arrangements such as family systems and clientelistic political practices.
To summarize, therefore, a strong concept of world citizenship can certainly not shed further light on the emergence of transnational social rights, and a notion of a linear progression of citizenship from the municipality to the state and then to the global level would be misleading.
Then again, normative theories of world citizenship allude to a world society as a horizon of meaning and expectation which already embraces meta-norms such as equality (of opportunity) and democracy. Political-sociological approaches, on the other hand, not only refer to transnational or even global horizons of expectation, as the world citizenship approach does, but also to institutional types of political multilevel systems and multi-agency constellations, like for example international regimes at state level, or networks of state and non-state organisations. The prime starting point for a debate on global social rights, however, is the fragmentation of citizenship and, consequently, social citizenship in partial worlds, as full membership of a political system is the key determiner of social inequality, and hence also the unequal distribution of social rights. To this end, the legal and political dimensions of the concept of citizenship must first be differentiated. The legal dimension constitutes nationality, and the political dimension refers to (state) citizenship. By nationality is meant the legal membership of an individual to one (or more) states, whereby the right to confer membership is the exclusive domain of the state (Faist 2007: chapter 1) . As a rule, the requirement for full membership of a state, and thus for all rights, is nationality. Nationality thus serves as a mechanism that upholds social exclusivity. State citizenship, on the other hand, denotes the political dimension and is a function of three mutually dependent components. These are (1) equal political liberty, which is generally known as democracy; (2) equal rights 6 and obligations, and (3) affiliation to a 5 While some authors maintain that the global inequalities in income have fallen over the past two decades, others observe an increase. These different assessments can mainly be attributed to the different measuring criteria used. Those examining international inequalities work on the basis of the average per capita income of a country, while transnational inequalities are simply measured in terms of the accumulated average income of each country. Those scrutinising global inequalities use a composite of international inequalities and domestic inequalities (see, e.g. Milanovic 2005 on the various measurement criteria). If one studies transnational inequality, i.e. taking countries as the unit of observation, then the inequality of income has increased since 1980. If one works on the basis of international inequality, however, then one can identify a drop in inequalities in income, which is mainly attributable to income growth in China and India (World Bank 2006: 75). 6 Nationality ensures that a full national cannot be expelled from a country. Nationality entails an unrestricted right of residence and a right to enter that country.
political community which is often defined as a nation. The latter is often also understood as a basis for generalised reciprocity and diffuse solidarity.
Not only the social status of an individual within a society, but especially his or her right to reside in a specific state and to have access to (social) rights, determines that individual's life chances. Nationality thus expresses the status of individuals within a transnational context.
Seen thus, passports and visas are the key institutional instruments of social inequality (Shachar 2003 World IV comprises the most impoverished countries, in which the status of statehood, and consequently citizenship, are extremely precarious, ranging from an inability to implement legitimate force to failed states (see Fig. 1 ). (Deacon 1997) . Social policies in the other three world sectors are, as a rule, categorised and evaluated against the backdrop of concepts that developed in the industrialized countries. The constitutive basis of such welfare-state systems was, and continues to be, a specific type of capitalist markets and the way in which these are regulated. This type of welfare-state system is market-structured, and exists in the context of politically regulated employment markets as the primary means of livelihood, and in highly differentiated financial markets that provide secure prospects for investors. A relatively autonomous state is essential for the political constitution and regulation of such markets. Only against this background, and in particular with the help of historical compromises between social classes regarding the regulation of markets, was that which T.H. Marshall called democratic-welfarecapitalism and characterized as a hyphenated society conceivable (Marshall 1985: 104) .
Over the past thirty years, social policies in these welfare states have stagnated, but despite frequent reforms they have not (yet) been subjected to fundamental deconstruction (Borchert 1998 ).
Furthermore, in at least one region of this particular partial world -namely within the EUcautious endeavours are being made at supra-state level to establish elements of social citizenship, or what can be described as "nested citizenship" (Faist 2001) , within a multi-level political system. EU citizenship and social rights within the EU are codified at different levels and nested within each other. Sub-state, regional, state and supra-state regulations on citizenship mutually complement each other, but without seriously endangering the status of integration in which the influence of the member states is usually seen to be dominantdespite the pressure on the social security systems arising from the freedom to provide services and right to compete. In addition to the much-debated legitimacy deficit and the issue of national autonomy of member states and their welfare systems, a further pan-EU problem also lies in the socio-cultural resources required for citizenship. The rapid economic integration has so far not been matched by an adequate harmonization and adaptation of social policies and social rights. Nor have threats to social rights at member-state level been absorbed through supra-state regulations. Union citizenship, which was established through the Treaty of Maastricht, cannot therefore be regarded as an effective step towards creating and maintaining substantial social rights. Many of these regulations can, however, be interpreted as the outcome of market-creating, 'negative integration' in the EU -i.e. the abolition of barriers to the free exchange of production factors which include goods, capital, services and also freedom of work. In this connection many continue to warn against an increasing discrepancy between economic integration and social welfare, because the rapid pace of economic integration is not paralleled by an advancement in social policy and social legislation (Streeck 1996: 64) . Others again point to indications of a 'positive coordination' in the EU. Their cautious optimism refers to the beginnings of supra-state political integration with the potential for federalization at several governance levels (see Kaufmann 1997: 133) .
All these analyses suggest that what we see is not simply a replica of a member-state's welfare policies as a combination of distributive, redistributive and regulative policies at EU level, but regulative forms of social policy and social rights.
The rights of market citizens within the EU -as consumers, employees, business people, dealers -are the most comprehensive and legally most differentiated of EU legislation.
Market citizenship, which is not based on social rights, but is regarded as a form of social investment in human capital, can be seen to progress in established policy areas. An example of this is childcare. Decisions on childcare used to be an exclusively family affair.
Gradually, however, there has grown a greater awareness that more public effort must be put into childcare if women are to have the same citizen-worker status as men. This is a continuation of established forms of gender policy (cf. Meehan 1993: 101-120). Even at supra-state level within the EU there are now elements of soft law for coordinating and further developing social rights or standards. These elements rely not on sanctions, but on voluntary undertakings, procedurally laid down in the so-called Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The aim is to encourage socio-political improvements and rights through setting policy goals and publishing progress reports. Notwithstanding these progressive elements of supra-state social citizenship it should be born in mind that at the national level the debate over the disparity between rapidly progressing economic change and inadequate social security continues. Nevertheless, even as the social question, including signs of pauperisation and the formation of underclasses (Wilson 1987) , again becomes a central issue of public debate in World I, the scale and severity is still not comparable with that of other partial worlds (world sectors?).
In World II, which roughly covers the transformation states of Eastern Europe and the NICs in South-eastern Asia, social rights developed in the last decades of the 20 th century primarily against the background of nationalistic state-citizenship concepts that were typical of developing countries. For eastern European states formerly under the influence of the Soviet Union and the GUS states the further development of social rights is a prime objective within the context of the transition to capitalist economies. At the same time, the dismantling of formerly guaranteed social rights cannot be overlooked (Standing 1996) . This is by no means the case for other transformation states, however, and especially for those that recently underwent the transition from authoritarian development regimes to democracy. In some cases -for instance in Taiwan and South Korea, democratization changed the incentives for politicians, bureaucrats and civil society actors to such an extent that an expansion of social rights, for example in the healthcare sector, can be observed (Wong 2004) . For example, politicians have been able to garner votes by introducing social policies. It is no coincidence, however, that in the successful NICs in Southeast Asia the emphasis lay less in social security, and more in social investments. Priority was therefore given to education and health, which can be categorized as market-making policy areas. Typically, the social insurance systems that have been developed in Southeast Asia since the early 1980s as a rule do not take into account measures for securing minimum means of subsistence for the very poor, so this still remains a vital informal sector (Freiberg-Strauß 1998: 93).
Characteristic of World III is a structural heterogeneity in all areas of society. While elements of social security benefits can especially be found among metropolitan public servants, social security is of a more informal nature in other sectors and regions. This creates a cleavage between urban and rural areas. Urban areas are seen as zones of modern citizenship, while in the rural areas "traditional" rights and obligations prevail -the list of dichotomies can be continued. In Africa in particular, this structure can be characterised as a legacy of colonialism (Mamdani 1996) . In certain sub-Saharan regions of Africa some forms of exclusive citizenship based on ethnicity are identifiable as a source of instability and conflict.
In Latin America, this structural heterogeneity obtains within distinctive formal or informal security systems. Many Latin American countries already have a relatively extensive social security system in comparison to other countries in the southern hemisphere. These often comprise state organised, guaranteed pension and health insurance schemes, and sometimes even rudimentary unemployment insurance systems, as in Chile and Venezuela.
As a rule, however, the indigent are excluded from the social insurance systems. Only a minority of wage-earners and middle-class white-collar workers are able to benefit from them. The security systems for which these categories are applicable are often of a clientelistic nature, i.e. part of an asymmetrical deal entailing votes for ad-hoc promises.
Since the 1970s, with the breakaway from the import-substitution model, the structural adjustment measures of the IMF pressed for at least partial privatisation. This, together with a loss of political significance for public servants, trade unions and the industrial proletariat, eliminated the previously existing similarities with southeast European social states (Barrientos 2004) . The chief guiding principle of international organisations from the 1970s until well into the 1990s was the assertion that social security would improve above all through economic growth, the growth of the formal employment market and increasing urbanisation (Gertler 1998 Altogether it is therefore questionable whether, in the light of such heterogeneity of the world sectors, the development of social rights within a world society is not too ambitious a notion.
There exist quite divergent principles of social organisation for social security: formally differentiated systems in World I and partly also in World II, security only available to certain sectors of the population -primarily privileged public employees and unionised employees in the private sector -in Worlds III and IV. For the majority of the population in Worlds III and IV there are informal security systems; in World IV, owing to the low degree of statehood, the regulation of insecurity rather than social security could be said to be the goal. In brief, therefore, it can hardly be claimed that the large majority of citizens around the world enjoys the benefits of state-guaranteed social rights. At best, those excluded from such social rights themselves organise informal systems that primarily comprise non-state actors such as landowners, religious communities and kinship systems. A key point of interest here is whether and in what way development aid or remittances back home from migrants, both of which make up a large portion of the gross national product in many countries of Worlds II and III, give rise to and promote group interests and political coalitions -and how these in turn influence, and perhaps even perpetuate informal systems of social security (cf. Faist 2006) .
It should also be borne in mind that the organisation of social welfare in many countries is a contentious issue between governments and their political opposition. One example of this from Worlds III and IV are Islamic solidarity networks (Schulze 2004) , in whose discourse generalised reciprocity and diffuse solidarity is ascribed to their fundamental religious principles, and who publicly compete with states in this field. Organisations such as the Muslim Brothers in Egypt emerged in the 1990s both as welfare organisations and political organisations (Ayubi 1991: 195-200) . In countries in which Islamist organisations participated in the elections, social welfare was even used as a central element of their election manifestos, as was the case in Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and, briefly, in Algeria. One can see here how social citizenship and thus a correlation between social rights and the legitimacy of political regimes are created.
Three points are particularly worthy of further discussion here. Firstly, the transnational social question must be seen in the light of a highly fragmented world with respect to the vast range of opportunities that nationality and social citizens' rights provide in different countries.
Emergent transnational social rights must not only be considered in terms of specific sectors, e.g. in the transnational business sector, but also in terms of specific countries. States in World IV that are not integrated to a significant degree through trade and investment in the world economy have hardly any businesses with, for instance, labour and social standards as defined by international conventions. Secondly, an analysis of transnational social rights cannot be made in isolation from their non-state institutional substructures, as otherwise the dynamics of social security verifiably provided, for instance, through informal obligations and undertakings by transnational migrants will be neglected. Thirdly, the formal, and implicitly also the informal means of providing security in Worlds III and IV are determined by transnational factors to a greater degree than in World I. Such factors are institutional such as the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO, that determine parameters through rules and the provision of finance; commercial factors such as transnational capital and investments of foreign investors; civil societal through transnational NGOs and the significant role they play in development aid or cooperation; and kinship systems through migrants and their remittances back home.
IV. On the Emergence and Significance of Genuinely Transnational

Social Standards
Against the background of the constitutive significance of nationality and the different types of social citizenship outlined above, which in the case of Worlds III and IV do not correspond to European concepts and models, we can now examine ways in which social standards are regulated as they begin to crystallize at a transnational level and which are potentially the precursors of transnational social rights. Research so far works on the notion of a continuous extension of social rights ranging from the national to the regional and ultimately the global level in a concentric fashion. It is a common assumption that with increasing range, the generalised reciprocity and diffuse forms of solidarity observable at least in western welfare states gradually become weaker. At global level at best a weak form of solidarity is conceivable, say, in the form of the universal recognition of human rights and their guarantee through the United Nations (UN) . The larger the group of persons involved becomes, the more general, the less specific, the slighter an awareness of a sense of obligation and the weaker the degree of its institutionalization becomes (cf. Beckert et al. 2004 ).
An analysis of transnational rights must not stop here, however. After all, a struggle for new social and labour norms is currently taking place. These norms are not necessarily identical with national social rights, but they must be implemented at the national level in order to take effect. The transnational regulation of employment and social standards comprises international regimes such as the International Labour Organisation, or ILO, social clauses in trade agreements, public codes of conduct, the OECD/IAO Guidelines and the UN Global
Compact; but it also includes more private transnational regulatory forms such as codes of conduct for specific businesses, international framework agreements or social labels (Dombois 2005) . The governance of social and labour standards is characterised by a wide diversity of work regulations involving the traditional agents, viz. the state, the trade unions and employers associations, but also new actors such as social movements and NGOs. For this reason the architecture of institutionalized transnational standards and the limits of institutionalization should also be described, whereby it is striking that the justifications for, say, labour and social standards, insofar as they are represented by international organisations like the ILO, have in recent decades increasingly merged with the human rights discourse. Another salient point is that sanctionable rights and obligations have to an increasing degree been substituted by employers' voluntary self-regulation, especially in the case of transnational businesses (Scherrer and Greven 2001) . Such standards are frequently therefore private, voluntary transnational arrangements, or soft law, and their regulation relies on cooperation, rather than sanctions (Commission on Global Governance 1995: 2).
The major issue for the future is therefore whether in transnational political multilevel systems rights can be legally claimed at all. This question can be pursued by scrutinizing the case of labour and social standards. 7
There are manifold instances of labour and social standards as a form of multilevel policy.
This means that social standards are localised at several levels and embedded within an interactive system of politics, policies and social rights that connect sub-state, state, interand supra-state levels with each other (Sassen 2002 ). The problems involved in the creation of common norms, their implementation and their ambit of validity, already clearly visible in the context of the EU multilevel system, are further magnified at global level. There is also a further distinction at suprastate level between international and transnational macromechanisms, namely between international regimes in the form of inter-state regulations, and transnational policy networks. The existence of international regimes, which create common rules, norms and policies, already indicates that the management of many global processes depends on national institutional factors. In fact, many international organisations like for example the ILO, or regimes such as the NAALC, which is the subsidiary agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on labour rights and labour conditions, have no powers of enforcement or sanction mechanisms in their own right. Within the NAFTA context, only few cases have actually been referred to the official conflict resolution bodies (Dombois, Hornberger and Winter 2004) . Global policy networks, as distinct from international regimes, can at best be seen as catalysts for the development of social and labour standards. Such networks cover speciality areas and often include governments, transnational enterprises (TNEs), trade unions (Greven 2006) , employers' associations and civil society organisations (Benner et al. 2001: 364-5) . Apart from inadequacies in realisation and implementation, obvious problems of international regimes and transnational policy networks also include the narrow range of regulated issues.
Characteristic of such multilevel systems are a multitude of old and new actors:
representatives of international organisations, governments, NGOs, trade unions and businesses. The new actors include organisations of the so-called transnational civil society.
They doubtlessly serve to promote the growth of a transnational public. Their strategies include, for instance, the oft-invoked advocacy coalitions, which use tactics such as global observatories and public shaming. Unlike international regimes, such network organisations are defined by joint action rather than common values and goals. One of the key problems for NGOs is the uneven access to resources in different regions of the world. As with trade unions, the problem of North-South paternalism is also manifest in NGOs. Demands for binding transnational work regulations are often interpreted in Worlds II and III as endeavours by World I to assert political dominance or even to impose economic protectionism. Thus it is civil societal organisations themselves, in their cross-regional relations, which replicate well-known social inequalities through a kind of "international clientelism" uniting the "market of projects of the North" with the "donation market of the South" (Möller 1992 (Adejumobi 2001) and the respective interpretations of modernity and tradition (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 1999) . The problem also becomes quite manifest in discussions over citizenship in Latin America, for instance in the debate on whether paternalistic, clientelistic forms of political participation -i.e. clientship rather than citizenship -can also be deemed a valid form of democratic citizenship (Dagnoni 2003 versus Taylor 2004 . The central issue here is to what extent clientelism, which does actually permit short-term social security arrangements, rules out the autonomy of individuals as citizens in the long run.
An alternative to the notion that there is only one ideal social legal practice for the whole world is the proposition that an "institutional monoculture" (Evans 2004) , as nurtured over the past few decades through the conditions laid down by the IMF and the World Bank, is not an appropriate means of eliminating social inequality. This proposition is equally valid for concepts of privatisation and deregulation as well as those of good governance or socially sustainable development. This approach places more emphasis on capabilities rather than the somewhat restricted concept of entitlements in order to determine what opportunities there are for having the freedom of choice. In this way, not only social rights as a substantive, i.e. materially normative basis, but also the procedural requirements for social citizenship are brought into the discussion. Individual and collective participation are then not only conceived of as a means, but also as a goal in itself, in other words, participatory political institutions become meta-institutions (Sen 1999: 291; cf. Nussbaum 2002) , in that they lay down procedures for political decision-making. Such institutions facilitate the freedom to choose, and this can be used to improve the quality of other institutions, i.e. also in terms of social security. Political citizenship thus remains the basis of substantive social citizenship. 10 It becomes apparent that strong democratic states are a pre-requisite for a viable civil society (see Tocqueville as early as 1959).
Besides a structural analysis of the transnational social question, the use of the postulate of equality and democracy as meta-norms must also be analysed. Although in most partial worlds democracy, as the basis for citizenship, cannot be regarded as a legitimate 10 The reduction of the three elements democracy, rights and obligations, and collective identity to the latter two dimensions is a decisive weakness of the "postnational" concepts of citizenship (Soysal 1994) . Through this reduction it is no longer clear whether and in what way, and through which agents meta-norms are converted into collectively binding decisions.
counterbalance to the market-based inequalities of capitalism in the same way as the European-type national welfare state, its significance as a meta-norm must nevertheless not be neglected. This raises the question what connotations the postulate of equality and democracy have under conditions of extreme inequality. Further, which agents advocate the discursive treatment and structuring of these meta-norms, and what do they themselves understand by the postulates of equality and democracy? 11 The reactions of European political elites of the 19 th century, already mentioned above, to the "vagabond poor" (de Swaan 1988 what does it say in the book?), and the integration of the working classes into the emergent nation-states through legislation, as for instance in the case of Bismarck's social insurance laws, signalled the beginning of European welfare statehood. In the reembedding of economic processes into socio-political arrangements "from below" in Europe the working class movement also played a crucial role (Polanyi 2001) . Today, too, at least intellectually, the quest continues for an alternative civil society in which organised peasants, migrants, employees and the self-employed in the informal sector, and gender issues, matter (cf. Lachenmann 1998).
In the light of the fragmentation of life chances and social rights, and mindful of new architectures of governance and socio-political spaces that are not necessarily stateregulated, new methodological directions must be sought in order to embrace the mechanisms that process the transnational social question and the different forms, interpretations and combinations of social rights. For even on the optimistic assumption that a global social policy will take shape, it is by no means clear that the resultant global societal structural patterns will be conducive to convergent processes. Meta-norms, while by all means universally accepted, might still lead to path-dependent developments in the four partial worlds, which consolidate against the respective specific historic background of formal, informal or even insecurity systems of social security. A starting point for the analysis of these processes might be the inclusion of contributions from the different regions of the world to discourses on the transnational social question and social rights. With the help of approaches such as postcolonial studies (Loomba et al. 2005) , transnationalization (Glick Schiller 2005) and diaspora studies (Sheffer 2003) , the conceptual premises, analytical approaches, methodologies and methods of these contributions could be scrutinized.
Appropriate research methods include, for instance, multi-sited (field) research (Marcus 11 In the government declaration of US President Truman in 1949, in which he coined the term underdevelopment, democracy is the pervasive, transnational gospel: "Democracy alone can supply the vitalizing force to stir the peoples of the world into triumphant action, not only against their human oppressors, but also against their enemies -hunger, misery, and despair." (cited in Rist 1999: 250) 
